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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This study examines copyright flexibilities from the perspective of EU, international and national 
law. Why is there a need for flexibilities in copyright law today and to what extent are open norms 
compatible with the copyright system? Does the EU and international legal framework leave 
Member States discretion to adopt in their national laws open ‘fair use’ style limitations and 
exceptions to copyright? What kinds of flexibility presently exist in national copyright law? 
 
There appear to be good reasons and ample opportunity to (re)introduce a measure of flexibility in 
the national copyright systems of Europe. The need for more openness in copyright law is almost 
self-evident in this information society of highly dynamic and unpredictable change. A historic 
perspective also suggests that copyright law, particularly in the civil law jurisdictions of Europe, has 
lost much of its flexibility in the course of the past century. By contrast, with the accelerating pace 
of technological change in the 21st Century, and in view of the complex process of law making in 
the EU, the need for flexible copyright norms both at the EU and the national level is now greater 
than ever.  
 
Whereas legal doctrines external to copyright, such as freedom of expression and information, and 
abuse of right, may on occasion provide ‘first aid’, the authors of this study believe that a measure 
of flexibility should be available inside the system of copyright proper. But this need not imply the 
introduction into European copyright law of an American-style general fair use provision. There are 
drawbacks and risks associated with establishing a completely open norm into copyright systems 
that, like those of the author’s right tradition in most Member States, traditionally provide for 
circumscribed limitations and exceptions that offer a good deal of predictability and legal security. 
We would therefore recommend to introduce a measure of flexibility alongside the existing 
structure of limitations and exceptions, and thus combine the advantages of enhanced flexibility 
with legal security and technological neutrality. 
 
The EU copyright acquis leaves considerably more room for flexibilities than its closed list of 
permitted limitations and exceptions suggests. In the first place, the enumerated provisions are in 
many cases categorically worded prototypes rather than precisely circumscribed exceptions, thus 
leaving the Member States broad margins of implementation. In the second place, the EU acquis 
leaves ample unregulated space with regard to the right of adaptation that has so far remained 
largely unharmonized. A Member State desiring to take full advantage of all policy space available 
under the Information Society Directive, might achieve this by literally transposing the Directive’s 
entire catalogue of exception prototypes into national law. In combination with the three-step test, 
this would effectively lead to a semi-open norm almost as flexible as the fair use rule of the United 
States. For less ambitious Member States seeking to enhance flexibility while keeping its existing 
structure of limitations and exceptions largely intact, we recommend exploring the policy space left 
by distinct exception prototypes. In addition, the unharmonized status of the adaptation right would 
leave Member States free to provide for limitations and exceptions permitting, for example, fair 
transformative uses in the context of producing and disseminating user-generated content. 
 
Member States aspiring to introduce flexible copyright norms are advised to take advantage of the 
policy space that presently exists in EU law, and not wait until initiatives to introduce flexibilities at 
the EU level materialize. In this way, national models can be developed and tested in practice that 
may serve as a basis for more flexible future law making at EU level. 
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PREFACE 
 
This study examines flexibilities in copyright law from the perspective of EU, international and 
national law. It was written jointly by Prof. Dr. P. Bernt Hugenholtz (University of Amsterdam) and 
Prof. Dr. Martin R.F. Senftleben (VU University Amsterdam). A draft was circulated among 
participants to an academic expert’s workshop that was organized in Amsterdam on September 17, 
2011.1 The authors of this study are very grateful for all comments and other feedback received 
from the workshop participants. 
 
Funding for this project was secured from Google. The authors have however carried out this study 
in complete academic independence. 
                                                 
1
 Participants included Prof. Valérie-Laure Bénabou, Prof. Thomas Dreier, Prof. Christophe Geiger, Prof. Frank Gotzen,  
Prof. Jonathan Griffiths, Prof. Marie-Christine Janssens, Dr. Giuseppe Mazziotti, Prof. Gerard Spindler, Prof. Alain 
Strowel, Prof. Antoon Quaedvlieg, and Prof. Raquel Xalabarder Plantada. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
While fair use in Europe is often regarded as an oxymoron or even a taboo in classic author’s rights 
doctrine, the idea of introducing a measure of flexibility in the European system of circumscribed 
limitations and exceptions is gradually taking shape. Maintaining a closed list of copyright 
exceptions is increasingly difficult in a world of rapid and unpredictable technological 
development, and hard to reconcile with a generally recognized need to create technologically 
neutral copyright norms. Already in 2006 the Gowers Review in the United Kingdom recommended 
that an exception be created for ‘creative, transformative or derivative works’ (particularly in the 
context of user-generated content), within the confines of the Berne Convention (BC) three-step 
test.2 In 2008 the European Commission took this suggestion on board in its Green Paper on 
Copyright in the Knowledge Economy.3 The Dutch Government has repeatedly confirmed its 
commitment to initiate a discussion at the European political level on a fair use rule European-
style.4 In April 2010 a group of European academics released a draft of a European Copyright Code 
that includes a structure of flexible limitations and exceptions.5 In May 2011 the Hargreaves 
Review in the United Kingdom, while considering that “importing Fair Use wholesale was unlikely 
to be legally feasible in Europe”, recommended “that the UK could achieve many of its benefits by 
taking up copyright exceptions already permitted under EU law and arguing for an additional 
exception, designed to enable EU copyright law to accommodate future technological change where 
it does not threaten copyright owners.” 6  The UK Government’s response to the Review7 also 
underscores the need for flexibility in EU copyright law.  
 
This study looks at copyright flexibilities from the perspective of EU, international and national 
law. Why is there a need for flexibilities in copyright law today and to what extent are open norms  
compatible with the copyright system? Does the EU and international legal framework leave  
Member States, in particular those states that subscribe to the tradition of droit d’auteur, discretion 
to adopt in their national laws open ‘fair use’ style limitations and exceptions to copyright? What 
kinds of flexibility presently exist in national copyright law? 
 
The primary aim of this study is to examine the policy space that Member States aspiring to 
introduce or enhance flexibilities in national copyright law currently enjoy within the confines of 
the EU and international framework. Whereas good arguments can be made in favour of amending, 
for example, the EU Information Society Directive that provides for a closed list of enumerated 
exceptions (a revision that might take more than a decade to accomplish), the purpose of this study 
is not to propose ‘ideal’ solutions, but – much less ambitiously – to examine whether flexibilities at 
the national level can co-exist with the European and international acquis. The main focus of this 
study is on Member States of the droit d’auteur (author’s right) tradition, such as Germany, France 
and the Netherlands, where exceptions are enumerated in an exhaustive fashion, and the law of 
copyright does not provide for an overriding rule of fairness.  
 
This study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a general discussion of open norms in 
copyright regimes, and seeks to explain why copyright law has lost its flexibility, particularly in 
author’s right regimes. Chapter 3 examines and illustrates the need for enhanced flexibility in 
                                                 
2
 Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (December 2006), Recommendation 11, available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/other/0118404830/0118404830.pdf. 
3
 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on copyright in the knowledge economy Brussels’, COM(2008) 466/3 
(16.07.2008), p. 19-20. 
4
 Kamerstuk (Parliamentary Record) 21501-34, no. 155; see 
http://www.boek9.nl/?//Kabinet%3A+discussie+starten+over+een+uitzondering+voor+fair+use////27678/. 
5
 See the ‘Wittem’ code, available at www.copyrightcode.eu. 
6
  I. Hargreaves, ‘Digital opportunity. A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth’, May 2011, p. 5, available at  
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf. 
7
 http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf. 
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copyright, by referring to recent court decisions. Chapter 4, the pièce de résistance of this report, 
explores the policy space that the European legal framework, in particular the Information Society 
Directive, leaves to Member States aspiring to introduce flexible copyright exceptions. This chapter 
also scrutinizes the three-step test, and looks for breathing space beyond the EU acquis in the form 
of exceptions to the (unharmonized) right of adaptation. Chapter 5 offers conclusions. 
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2. COPYRIGHT, DROIT D’AUTEUR AND OPEN NORMS 
 
Copyright is not absolute, but a right that is confined by a subtle structure of limits and limitations. 
In the ideal copyright system these limits and limitations are essential balancing tools, calibrated to 
allow users of copyright works sufficient freedoms to interact with these works without unduly 
undermining copyright’s multiple rationales. While the general limits of copyright define the 
subject matter, scope of protection and duration of the exclusive rights, the statutory limitations (or 
‘limitations and exceptions’ as they are often called) accommodate more specifically a variety of 
cultural, social, informational, economic and political needs and purposes. Flexibilities may be 
found in all elements of this structure. For example, the notion of ‘originality’ and the 
idea/expression dichotomy allow courts considerable ad hoc freedoms to decide what is and what is 
not copyright protected. By the same token, the rules on copyright infringement leave courts 
discretion, particularly in jurisdictions where the scope of copyright protection is determined by the 
(level of) originality of the appropriated portion of the work. Flexibilities are also implicit in the 
‘substantial part’ infringement analysis in common law jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom.8 
Regardless of the relative fluidity of these and other core concepts of copyright law, limitations and 
exceptions are obviously the main instruments of flexibility. This study will therefore focus on 
limitations and exceptions in copyright.  
 
Like any other structure of rulemaking, copyright law must mediate between the maxims of legal 
security, which favors precisely defined legal provisions that provide optimal predictability ex post, 
and of fairness, which favors open and flexible legal concepts that allow a wide margin of judicial 
appreciation ad hoc. In civil law this compromise between legal security and fairness is achieved by 
codifying relatively abstract and open legal provisions that spell out the general rules without 
impeding civil courts to apply general normative principles, such as ‘reasonableness and fairness’ 
(in Dutch: redelijkheid en billijkheid;  in German: Treu und Glauben), to arrive at fair judgments. In 
common law, by contrast, codified norms tend to be more precise and extensive, since they constrict 
rather than empower the court’s mandate to apply the common law to distinct cases. Moreover, 
while civil law codifications seek to set out the general principles of the law, in common law 
jurisdictions, where the law primarily serves to overrule, correct or clarify the principles of common 
law already established by the courts, such legal principles are usually absent from the written law.9 
 
In copyright law, these conflicting traditions of codification are still visible today in the relatively 
concise, abstractly phrased codes of the droit d’auteur tradition, and the much more voluminous 
and detailed codifications of Anglo-American copyright law. Whereas, for example, the Dutch 
Copyright Act at latest count comprises some 75 provisions laid down in a mere 20 pages, the 
volume of the US Copyright Act presently exceeds 200 pages. 
 
These systemic differences to some extent explain why general rules of fairness are mostly absent 
from the laws of the droit d’auteur tradition. The flexibility that civil law traditionally provided by 
way of a structure of abstract and fairly open norms never required codification of a general rule of 
fairness. By contrast, such a rule – originally developed by the US courts in the course of more than 
a century of common law jurisprudence – eventually did find its way into the US Copyright Act. 10 
 
                                                 
8
 See e.g. Baigent v Random House [2007] EWCA Civ 247 (CA) (holding that there was no copyright infringement 
despite the proven copying of a factual historical work).   
9
 A. Strowel, Droit d’auteur et copyright (1993), p. 147. 
10
 U.S. Copyright Act, S 107, provides that uses for such purposes as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship and research are fair and non-infringing depending on four factors: the purpose and character of the use; the 
nature of the copyrighted work; the amount appropriated from the copyrighted work; and the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
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An example of a fairly open – but not general – exception commonly found in laws of the authors’ 
right tradition is the quotation right, which will be discussed in more detail elsewhere in this 
report.11 Article 10(1) BC requires Contracting States to provide for copyright limitations that 
permit quotations subject to certain conditions ‘provided that their making is compatible with fair 
practice’. The corresponding provision of Article 5(3)(d) of the Information Society Directive 
similarly refers to ‘fair practice’, whereas its implementation into Dutch law (Article 15(a) of the 
Dutch Copyright Act) requires the quotation be ‘commensurate with what might reasonably be 
accepted in accordance with social custom and the number and size of the quoted passages are 
justified by the  purpose to be achieved’. References to fair practice also appear in several other 
limitations and exceptions in civil law jurisdictions. For example, the French parody exemption that 
has inspired the inclusion of parody in the Information Society’s ‘shopping list’ of limitations, refers 
to ‘the rules of the genre’.12  
 
Unfortunately, as Prof. Strowel has explained13, droit d’auteur codifications have lost much of their 
flexibility in the course of the 20th Century, as copyright laws were updated ever more frequently to 
accommodate the needs of a changing society, so as to respond to technological development and to 
implement the dictates of European harmonization. Consequently, much of the original conciseness, 
elegance and openness of the laws following the droit d’auteur tradition has been lost.  
 
A possibly more important reason why laws of the author’s rights tradition are less tolerant of 
unauthorized but ‘fair’ uses, lies in the natural rights rationale that underpins the author’s rights 
paradigm. If protecting author’s rights is essentially a matter of fairness, limitations to this right 
must remain ‘exceptions’. Following this line of reasoning, courts in droit d’auteur jurisdictions 
have developed a rule of restrictive interpretation of copyright limitations.14 A somewhat similar 
rule of narrow construction, based however on principles of EU law, has been embraced by the EU 
Court of Justice in its Infopaq decision.15 By contrast, the US copyright system that has its main 
justification in utilitarian considerations (‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts’16), 
more easily absorbs ‘fair’ uses that are in line with its main goal of optimizing the production and 
dissemination of creative works.  
 
In parallel with this tendency towards ‘closure’, and inspired by economic theories (and powerful 
lobbies) that posit copyright as (intellectual) ‘property’, the economic rights that the law grants to 
copyright owners are increasingly perceived, by courts, politicians and some scholars alike, as 
absolute. According to these theories, just as property rights in tangible goods warrant complete and 
perpetual control, making unauthorized uses unlawful as a matter of principle, copyright should 
ideally become a perpetual and absolute right that tolerates few or no ‘free’ uses.17 
 
Paradoxically, as droit d’auteur has gradually lost its openness, the need for flexibility in copyright 
law has greatly increased. Whereas legislatures of the 19th and early 20th Century could still 
anticipate and adequately respond to the main technological changes that required modification of 
the law, the accelerating pace of technological change in the early 21st Century no longer allows 
such legislative foresight. Conversely, the length of the legislative cycle in copyright has become 
ever longer, as copyright law is no longer perceived as a mostly ‘technical’ legal matter but has 
become highly politicized. Making matters worse, the European harmonization machinery has 
added an additional, complex and lengthy legislative cycle. As a result the total legislative response 
                                                 
11
 See § 4.1. 
12
 Intellectual Property Code (France), Article L122-5 (4). 
13
 A. Strowel, ibid., p. 149. 
14
 A. & H.-J. Lucas, Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique, 3rd ed., Paris (2006), p. 259-260. 
15
 CJEU, 16 July 2009, case C-5/08, Infopaq International/Danske Dagblades Forening,  para. 56-57. 
16
 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. 
17
 C. Geiger, ‘Flexibilising Copyright – Remedies to the Privatisation of Information by Copyright Law’, 39 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 178 (2008). 
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time to a new technological development may well exceed ten years.18 
 
All in all, the call for restoring (or introducing) a measure of flexibility in the law of copyright, in  
particular in author’s rights legislation in the European Union, should come as no surprise. This 
call, as is apparent by the title of this report and the corresponding research project, often goes by 
the name of ‘fair use’.19  While fair use is indeed an appealing concept and its political potential 
undeniable – who would dare disagree with ‘fair’? – there are conceptual and systemic dangers 
looming here. The doctrine of fair use has its origin in the common law of the United States. Simply 
transplanting this doctrine into civil law-based droit d’auteur might lead to unintended 
consequences and ultimately systemic rejection. 20   
 
More generally, there are obvious risks and drawbacks to a legal structure of open norms, such as 
fair use. There is a vast scholarly literature that analyzes the pro’s and con’s of ‘vague norms’ from 
various perspectives such as legal philosophy,21 law and economics22 and legal practice,23 which 
will not be rehearsed here. The main arguments against overly open or vague norms relate to the 
tradeoff between precise lawmaking by the legislature and ad hoc adjudication by the courts. While 
vague norms allow justice to be served more fairly in concrete cases – something that civil courts 
are generally well accustomed to – this enhanced fairness comes at the price of reduced legal 
security. Rules are generally more efficient than vague standards given that they better inform 
citizens of their rights and obligations upfront, and allow those seeking justice to assess their legal 
position without needing to resort to the courts. Admittedly, vague norms may eventually become 
more predictable as sufficient precedents (jurisprudence) are created by the courts, but this process  
may take many years or even decades to yield results.24 Moreover, an obvious constitutional 
objection against vague norms is that political decisions are effectively delegated from the legislator 
to the courts without the necessary democratic checks and balances. While open norms may thus be 
‘easy’ and relatively inexpensive for lawmakers to produce, the costs of the lawmaking process are 
shifted to the judicial apparatus, and to those seeking justice at the courts. Conversely, vague 
standards are generally more efficient, and will lead to fairer outcomes, in hard (marginal) cases and 
in situations that lawmakers can not predict. 
 
                                                 
18
 Mireille van Eechoud a.o., Harmonizing European Copyright Law. The Challenges of Better Lawmaking, Kluwer 
Law International, 2009. p. 298. 
19
 See, for example, the Dutch Government’s letter to the Parliament confirming its commitment to initiate a discussion 
at the European political level on a European-style fair use rule; Kamerstuk (Parliamentary Record) 21501-34, no. 155; 
see http://www.boek9.nl/?//Kabinet%3A+discussie+starten+over+een+uitzondering+voor+fair+use////27678/. 
20
 Nonetheless, this step has been proposed by J. Griffiths, ‘The ‘Three-Step Test’ in European Copyright Law – 
Problems and Solutions, Intellectual Property Quarterly 2009, 489, online available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1476968. With regard to the introduction of fair use in Israel, see O. Fischman Afori, ‘An Open 
Standard ‘Fair Use’ Doctrine: A Welcome Israeli Initiative’, European Intellectual Property Review 2008, 85; G. 
Pessach, ‘The New Israeli Copyright Act – A Case-Study in Reverse Comparative Law’, International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 41 (2010), 187. 
21
 F.  Schauer, Playing by the rules: a philosophical examination of rule-based decision-making in law and in life, 
Clarendon Press (1993). 
22
 L. Kaplow, ‘Rules versus standards’, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992),. 
23
 See e.g. J.M. Barendrecht, Recht als model van rechtvaardigheid: Beschouwingen over vage en scherpe normen, over 
binding aan het recht en over rechtsvorming. Deventer: Kluwer (1992). 
24
 With regard to the evolution of the fair use factor analysis in the US, see P. Samuelson, ‘Unbundling Fair Uses’, 77 
Fordham Law Review  2537 (2009); B. Beebe, ‘An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005’, 
156 Un. of Pennsylvania Law Review 549 (2008); P.N. Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, Harvard Law Review 103 
(1990), p. 1105; J. Litman, ‘Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image’, University of Dayton Law Review 22 
(1997), p. 588. For critical comments on the predictability and consistency of US fair use decisions, see D. Nimmer, 
‘“Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use’, Duke University Law Journal 66 (2003), p. 263; H. Cohen 
Jehoram, ‘Fair use – die ferne Geliebte’, AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 1998, p. 174. 
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For these reasons the rule of fair use as it presently exists and is applied in the United States has 
always attracted criticism, particularly for its presumed lack of predictability.25 While empirical 
research into fair use case law suggests that the fair use rule as it is applied by the lower federal 
courts actually provides considerably more legal security than is sometimes assumed,26 some 
commentators in the U.S. have argued for making U.S. copyright law more predictable by making 
the rule more precise, by adding more exceptions or by making the various policies underlying fair 
use more transparent.27 We would therefore not recommend simply replacing the existing structure 
of circumscribed limitations and exceptions commonly found in the copyright law of the Member 
States by a single overriding open norm, such as fair use.  
 
On the other hand, the advantage of legal security that is usually ascribed to the European system of 
precisely defined exceptions should not be overstated. In the first place, as will be explained below, 
courts unhappy with the literal application of a precise norm in a given case will often find solace in 
overriding (and usually vague) norms external to the law of copyright. In the second place, the 
introduction into the fabric of EU law of the ‘three-step test’28, and its literal implementation in 
several laws of the Member States, has considerably reduced legal security, since courts are now 
invited to examine and (re)interpret statutory exceptions in the light of this entirely open-ended 
norm. The permission to use a work without prior authorization given by the national law maker 
can ultimately be withdrawn by the court on the grounds that the use at issue supposedly conflicts 
with the three-step test of the Information Society Directive.29 As a result, the legal security that a 
structure of circumscribed limitations and exceptions might offer is severely undermined.30 
 
In conclusion, what copyright laws in Europe ideally need today is a statutory system of limitations 
and exceptions that guarantees both a level of legal security and fairness, by combining relatively 
precise norms with sufficient flexibility to allow a fair outcome in hard and/or unpredictable 
cases.31 An example of such a semi-open structure of limitations and exceptions can be found in the  
European Copyright Code that was drafted as a model law by a group of European scholars.32 
Article 5.5. of the Code permits the application by analogy of all limitations and exceptions 
specifically enumerated in the Code – both compensated and uncompensated – subject to the 
application of the three-step test. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 See e.g. J.P. Liu, ‘Regulatory Copyright’, 83 North Carolina Law Review 87 (2004). 
26
 B. Beebe, ‘An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions (1978-2005)’, 156 Un. of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 549 (2008). 
27
 P. Samuelson, ‘Unbundling fair uses’. 77 Fordham Law Review  2537 (2009). 
28
 Information Society Directive, Article 5.5. 
29
 For an overview of the application of the three-step test by national judges, see J. Griffiths, ‘The ‘Three-Step Test’ in 
European Copyright Law – Problems and Solutions, Intellectual Property Quarterly 2009, 489, online available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1476968; M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Bridging the Differences between Copyright's Legal Traditions – 
The Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine’, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 57, No. 3 (2010), p. 521, available 
at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723902. The Court of Justice EU itself referred to the three-step test in CJEU, 16 July 
2009, case C-5/08, Infopaq International/Danske Dagblades Forening, para. 58; CJEU, 4 October 2011, cases C-403/08 
and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League/QC Leisure, para. 181. 
30
 Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Fair Use in the Netherlands: A Renaissance?’, AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en 
informatierecht 2009, p. 1, online available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563986. 
31
 See Senftleben, supra note 28. For a detailed discussion of different implementation strategies, see A. Förster, Fair 
Use, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2008. 
32
 Wittem Group, European Copyright Code, available at www.copyrightcode.eu. 
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3. WHY COPYRIGHT NEEDS TO BE FLEXIBLE 
 
The current lack of flexibility in copyright law undermines the very fundamental freedoms, societal 
interests and economic goals that copyright law traditionally aims to protect and advance. This is 
the case particularly in the area of limitations and exceptions – an area where more than elsewhere 
in the law of copyright rules have become detailed, rigid and connected to specific states of 
technology. Examples abound. Whereas social media have in recent times become an essential  
means of social and cultural communication,33 current copyright law leaves little or no room for 
sharing ‘user-generated content’ that builds upon pre-existing works.34 By the same token, current 
limitations and exceptions rarely take into consideration current educational and scholarly practices, 
such as the use of copyright protected content in Powerpoint presentations, in ‘digital classrooms’, 
on university websites or in scholarly e-mail correspondence.35 Existing limitations and exceptions 
in many Member States’ copyright laws also find it hard to accommodate such essential information 
tools as search engines.36 By impeding these and other uses that should arguably remain outside the 
reach of copyright protection, the law’s overly rigorous structure impedes not only cultural, social 
and economic progress, but also undermines the social legitimacy of copyright law proper.  
 
The lack of flexibility of the present system of limitations and exceptions can be demonstrated by 
the way courts in several Member States have in recent years struggled to, nevertheless, protect the 
general social, cultural and economic interest by allowing certain ‘free uses’ not expressly 
recognized in the law. As the following exemplary cases reveal, courts have resorted to the 
application of a variety of – sometimes rather implausible – legal doctrines to create ad hoc legroom 
in the law of copyright. 
 
Dior v. Evora 
 
Where civil courts are generally reluctant to construe ‘unwritten’ exemptions, or even to apply 
existing exemptions by analogy,37 the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), not impressed by the 
maxim that exceptions are to be narrowly construed, has on one occasion held that there must be 
room to draw the borderlines of copyright outside the existing system of exemptions, on the basis of 
a balancing of interests similar to the rational underlying the existing exemption(s). The Dior v. 
Evora case involved the reproduction of copyrighted perfume bottles in advertisements by a retailer 
offering parallel-imported goods for sale. Having concluded that no statutory copyright exemption 
applied to the facts of the case, the Court accepted there was room to move outside the existing 
system of exemptions, on the basis of a balancing of interests similar to the rationale underlying the 
existing exemptions.38 According to some Dutch commentators, the judgment has opened the door 
to an American-style ‘fair use’ defense. Others much more cautiously interpret the Court’s decision 
merely as a form of reasoning by analogy well known in other areas of law.39 Anyway, the Dior 
decision has inspired the Dutch Copyright Committee, an advisory body to the Ministry of Justice, 
                                                 
33
 OECD, ‘Participative Web: User-Created Content’, document DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/Final, dated April 12, 2007, 
online available at http://www.oecd.org/document/40/0,3746,en_2649_34223_39428648_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
34
 Cf. E. Lee, ‘Warming Up to User-Generated Content’, University of Illinois Law Review 2008 (5), p. 1459, available 
online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116671; M. Knopp, ‘Fanfiction – nutzergenerierte Inhalte und das Urheberrecht’, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2010, p. 28; N. Helberger/L. Guibault/E.H. Janssen/N.A.N.M. van 
Eijk/C. Angelopoulos/J.V.J. van Hoboken, Legal Aspects of User Created Content, Amsterdam: IViR 2009, available 
online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499333. 
35
 See for other examples J. Tehranian, ‘Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap’, Utah Law 
Review, Vol. 2007, p. 537, 2007;  T. Wu, ‘Tolerated Use’, p. 1, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1132247. 
36
 See L. Guibault, ‘Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to Harmonisation’, JIPITEC 2010, Vol. 1, p. 57. 
37
 Cf. Manifest, Supreme Court of Sweden (Högsta Domstolen) 23 December 1985, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht Int. 1986, p. 739 (even if infringing use were justifiable, courts are not allowed to overrule legislature). 
38
 Dior v. Evora, Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) 20 October 1995, [1996] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 682. 
39
 F.W. Grosheide, ‘De commercialisering van het auteursrecht’, Informatierecht/AMI 1996, p. 43. 
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to propose – already in 1998 – the adoption of an open, fair-use type provision in copyright law.40 
The provision would allow for a variety of unspecified unauthorized uses, subject to a ‘three-step 
test’ consistent with Article 9(2) BC.41 
Germania 3 
 
National courts in Europe occasionally find normative inspiration in fundamental freedoms, such as 
freedom of expression, artistic freedom and the right to privacy. While most courts will shy away 
from directly overriding the rules of copyright, interpreting rights and limitations ‘in conformity’ 
with fundamental freedoms may lead to additional flexibilities.42 Surely the most spectacular 
example of such a normative interpretation comes from the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany. Its landmark Germania 3 decision concerned a play that contained extensive quotations, 
for a total of four pages, from a pair of Berthold Brecht plays. The quotations did not meet the 
stringent test of the statutory quotation right. The Court, however, held that in light of the freedom 
of artistic expression embedded in Article 5(3) of the Constitution, the quotation right deserves 
broad application with respect to artistic works. Authors must, to a certain degree, accept that works 
of art gradually enter the public domain. Copyright exemptions should be interpreted accordingly, 
and reflect a balancing of relevant interests. In the case at hand, the Court considered, the 
commercial interests of the copyright owner should give way to the user’s interest in providing 
artistic commentary.43 
 
Scientology v. XS4ALL 
 
In rare cases courts invoke fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and right to 
privacy, to directly override the rules of copyright.44 In a decision concerning the publication of 
semi-secret documents of the infamous Church of Scientology, the Court of Appeal of the Hague 
ruled that journalist Karin Spaink, who had posted the documents on her website, had not 
committed copyright infringement.45 Whereas Spaink could not rely on the quotation right 
enshrined in Dutch copyright law (article 15a of the Dutch Copyright Act), because the documents 
had never been lawfully published, Spaink successfully invoked direct application of article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of expression. According to 
the Court, in the case at hand extensively quoting from these documents was a legitimate form of 
publicly criticizing Scientology’s questionable ideas and behaviour. 
 
                                                 
40
 Commissie Auteursrecht, Advies over auteursrecht, naburige rechten en de nieuwe media, The Hague, 18 August 
1998. 
41
 Article 9(2) BC reads: “It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of 
such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.” 
42
 See a.o. P.B. Hugenholtz, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe’, in: N. Elkin-Koren & N.W. Netanel 
(eds.), The Commodification of Information, Information Law Series, Vol. 11, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer 
Law International 2002, p. 239-263; Ch. Geiger, ‘Die Schranken des Urheberrechts im Lichte der Grundrechte - Zur 
Rechtsnatur der Beschränkungen des Urheberrechts’, in: R.M. Hilty & A. Peukert (eds.), Interessenausgleich im 
Urheberrecht, 1, p. 43 (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004). 
43
 Germania 3 Gespenster am toten Mann, Federal Constitutional Court 29 June 2000, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und 
Medienrecht (ZUM) 2000, p. 867. 
44
 For example, Cour de Cassation (France), 2 October 2007, 214 R.I.D.A. 338 (2007) (HFA v. FIFA), found conflict 
with freedom of expression when the world football organization FIFA invoked copyright protection for the design of 
the FIFA World Cup against a newspaper publisher who had used a picture of the Cup for a photomontage on the cover 
of a football magazine. According to the Court, the trophy “symbolizes every professional footballer’s dream”, and is 
therefore “inseparable from the act of informing the public on the course of this major news event”, as guaranteed by 
the freedom of expression and information enshrined in Article 10 ECHR. 
45
 Court of Appeal The Hague, 4  September 2003 (Scientology/Spaink), AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en 
informatierecht 2003, p. 217-223. 
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Google Bildersuche 
 
The decision of the German Federal Supreme Court in the Google thumbnails (‘Bildersuche’) case 
provides yet another illustration of the way courts constricted by the closed system of limitations 
and exceptions look for flexibilities outside copyright law. 46 Recognizing that the right of quotation 
in German copyright law does not allow the reproduction and making available to the public of 
copyright protected pictures in ‘thumbnail’ form by the Google Image Search engine,47 the German 
Court found comfort for defendant, Google, by application of a doctrine of implied consent. While 
the Court refrained from inferring an implicit contractual license for search engine purposes from 
the mere act of making content available on the Internet,48 the Court held that Google’s use of the 
pictures was not unlawful because the copyright owner had consented implicitly to use of her 
material in the image search service by making her works available online without employing 
technical means to block the automatic indexing and displaying of online content by search 
engines.49  
 
Saif v. Google France 
 
The Google Image Search engine has also led to fascinating case law in France. After the Court of 
Paris saw fit to apply the law of the United States (i.e. fair use) to the allegedly infringing 
thumbnails being generated by the Google service, the Paris Court of Appeals found refuge for 
Google in the application by analogy of the safe harbour available under French law (in conformity 
with the EU E-Commerce Directive) to passive internet service providers.50 In this context the 
Court noted that the owners of copyright in the images at issue had failed to notify Google of the 
URL’s of the works that they wished to remove from the search engine’s  index. 
 
In other, equally rare cases courts in search of flexibility have resorted to the doctrines of misuse (in 
common law) or abuse (in civil law) of copyright. While such doctrines may on occasion offer users 
of copyright works a measure of comfort, these doctrines remain controversial in theory and are 
rarely applied by the courts in practice.51  
 
What all these cases demonstrate and have in common is that national courts in the EU recognize 
that copyright law currently lacks the capacity to accommodate certain free uses of copyright works 
that the courts find desirable for social, cultural, economic or other reasons. While the courts’ 
judicial resourcefulness deserves applause, these cases are therefore symptomatic of a legal system 
that lacks an appropriate escape valve. Flexibility should ideally be found inside the system of 
copyright proper.52 
 
 
                                                 
46
 See L. Guibault, ‘Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to Harmonisation’, Journal of Intellectual Property, Information 
Technology and E-Commerce Law 1 (2010), p. 55 (57), available at http://www.jipitec.eu. 
47
 See discussion below in § 4.1 
48
 Bundesgerichtshof, April 29, 2010, case I ZR 69/08, p. 14-15, online available in German at 
www.bundesgerichtshof.de. 
49
 Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., 15-19. 
50
 Cour d’Appel de Paris, 26 January 2011 (SAIF v. Google France), available at 
http://juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=1285. 
51
 C. Caron, ‘Abuse of Rights and Author’s Rights’, 176 R.I.D.A. 2, 4 (1998); A. van Rooijen, ‘Liever misbruikt dan 
misplaatst auteursrecht: Het doelcriterium ingezet tegen oneigenlijk auteursrechtgebruik’, AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-
, media- en informatierecht 2006, p. 45-51. 
52
 For a discussion of internal and external balancing, see Th. Dreier, ‘Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain 
Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?’, in: R. Dreyfuss/D. Leenheer-Zimmerman/H. First (eds.), Expanding 
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Economy, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2001, p. 295. 
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4. FLEXIBILITIES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE EU ACQUIS 
 
Given the need for enhanced flexibility, the time is ripe to explore the policy space offered by 
current copyright legislation in the EU. To provide a comprehensive overview, it is necessary to 
explore breathing space both inside and outside the copyright acquis. On the one hand, the 
traditional perception of the EU infrastructure for copyright limitations tends to neglect flexibilities 
by wrongly focusing on restrictions and constraints following from the exhaustive enumeration of 
permissible exceptions and the inclusion of the three-step test in the Information Society Directive. 
An alternative approach to the current EU framework, however, brings to light largely unexplored 
resources for more flexible national law making (4.1). On the other hand, considerable flexibility 
lies outside the acquis communautaire. In respect of forms of use not covered by harmonized 
copyright law, EU Member States enjoy far-reaching freedom to establish an alternative, more 
flexible system of limitations (4.2). 
 
4.1 Flexibilities Inside the EU Acquis 
 
The centerpiece of the acquis communautaire in the field of copyright and neighbouring rights – the 
2001 Information Society Directive (ISD) – sets forth a closed list53 of exceptions and limitations to 
the harmonized rights of reproduction and communication to the public.54 While the exemption of 
certain acts of temporary reproduction in Article 5(1) ISD is mandatory, Member States are free to 
make an individual choice from the optional exceptions in Article 5(2) and (3) ISD.  
 
These optional exceptions relate to diverse purposes, including private copying; use of copyrighted 
material by libraries, museums and archives; ephemeral recordings; reproductions of broadcasts 
made by hospitals and prisons; illustrations for teaching; use for scientific research; use for the 
benefit of people with a disability; press privileges; use for the purpose of quotations, caricature, 
parody and pastiche; use for the purposes of public security and for the proper performance or 
reporting of administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings; use of political speeches and 
public lectures; use during religious or official celebrations; use of architectural works located 
permanently in public places; incidental inclusions of a work in other material; use for the purpose 
of advertising the public exhibition or sale of artistic works; use in connection with the 
demonstration or repair of equipment; use for the reconstruction of buildings; and additional cases 
of use having minor importance. 
 
To ensure compliance with international obligations,55 particularly those resulting from the WIPO 
Internet Treaties,56 the mandatory and optional exceptions and limitations recognized in the 
Information Society Directive shall only be applied in accordance with the three-step test set forth 
in Article 5(5) ISD. This three-step test corresponds to the international provisions with the same 
criteria – ‘certain special cases’ (step 1), ‘no conflict with a normal exploitation’ (step 2) and ‘no 
unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests’ (step 3) – in Article 9(2) BC, Article 13 TRIPS and 
Article 10 WCT. 
 
                                                 
53
 Recital 32 of the Information Society Directive refers to an ‘exhaustive enumeration of exceptions and limitations to 
the right of reproduction and the right of communication to the public’. 
54
 Article 2 and 3 ISD. 
55
 Referring to the three-step test laid down in Article 5(5) ISD, Recital 44 stresses the need of exceptions and 
limitations being ‘exercised in accordance with international obligations’. 
56
 As stated in Recital 15, the Information Society Directive ‘serves to implement a number of the new international 
obligations’ under the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). 
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Flexibility Inherent in Exception Prototypes 
 
While certain features of this harmonized regulatory framework – the enumeration is closed, 
exceptions can additionally be scrutinized in the light of the three-step test – give rise to concerns 
about insufficient flexibility, it must not be overlooked that the list included in the Information 
Society Directive covers a wide variety of use privileges reflecting the diversity of national 
copyright traditions in EU Member States.57 A closer analysis of the individual elements of the 
enumeration, moreover, shows that many exceptions listed in Article 5 ISD constitute prototypes for 
national law making rather than precisely circumscribed exceptions with no inherent flexibility:58 
 
- Article 5(2)(b) ISD permits reproductions for non-commercial private use ‘on any medium’. 
The provision does not specify whether a legal source must be used for these privileged acts 
of private copying.  
- Article 5(2)(c) ISD covers ‘specific acts of reproduction’ made by publicly accessible non-
profit libraries, educational establishments or museums, or by archives. Apart from the 
exclusion of online delivery of protected material in Recital 40, the nature of these specific 
acts of reproduction remains undefined.  
- Article 5(3)(a) ISD exempts use for non-commercial scientific research and illustrations for 
teaching as long as the source is indicated. Recital 42 clarifies that the organizational 
structure and the means of funding of the privileged institution do not preclude the 
application of the exception. The non-commercial nature of the educational or research 
activity in question is decisive.  
- Article 5(3)(c) and (f) ISD allows use by the press of published articles on current economic, 
political or religious topics, use for the reporting of current events, and use of political 
speeches, extracts of public lectures and similar material. Use of this type must be justified 
by the underlying informatory purpose and, unless impossible, requires the indication of the 
author’s name. In the case of articles of current topics, copyright may expressly be reserved.  
- Article 5(3)(d) ISD allows quotations from material already lawfully made available to the 
public, for purposes such as criticism or review. The taking of material must be justified by 
the underlying purpose. In addition, the use must comply with fair practice. The author’s 
name must be indicated.  
- Article 5(3)(k) ISD generally exempts use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche 
without defining these purposes any further.  
- Article 5(3)(i) ISD generally privileges the incidental inclusion of protected material in other 
material without specifying the nature of the inclusion in question. 
 
The flexibility that is inherent in these exception prototypes can be demonstrated by different 
national implementation strategies. Transposing the Information Society Directive into national law, 
legislators in EU Member States, as indicated above, enjoyed the freedom to choose exceptions 
from the catalogue of Article 5 and tailor the scope of resulting use privileges to individual domestic 
needs. Apart from the mandatory exemption of temporary acts of reproduction, the adoption of 
exceptions at the national level is optional under the Information Society Directive. In consequence, 
the scope of a national exception based on a prototype listed in Article 5 ISD may differ from 
country to country. While certain EU Member States availed themselves of the flexibility inherent 
in rather general definitions of permissible limitations in the Information Society Directive, others 
decided to implement a less flexible variant of a given prototype. 
 
                                                 
57
 Recital 32 explicitly refers to the different legal traditions in EU Member States. As to the continuous extension of the 
list of exceptions against this background, cf. P.B. Hugenholtz, ‘Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and 
Possibly Invalid’, European Intellectual Property Review 2000, p. 499. 
58
 Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Beperkingen à la carte: Waarom de Auteursrechtrichtlijn ruimte laat voor fair use’, 
AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 2003, p. 10. 
 15
In this context, the implementation of the right of quotation reflected in Article 5(3)(d) ISD can 
serve as an example. French law is notoriously restrictive in allowing quotation only under strict 
conditions.59 By contrast, Nordic copyright law presents the quotation right as a relatively open rule 
of reason.60 For example, Article 22 of the Swedish Copyright Act61 provides that a published work 
may be quoted, ‘in accordance with proper usage and to the extent necessary for the purpose.’ This 
relatively abstract norm seems to leave room for a relatively broad spectrum of unauthorized 
transformative uses that exceed the traditional connotation of ‘citation’, making the Nordic 
quotation right a fairly open norm. 
 
Differences in the implementation of the quotation right can have a significant impact on the 
availability of information services in a given EU Member State. Implementing the Information 
Society Directive, the Dutch legislator decided to broaden the scope of the traditional right of 
quotation. The long-standing ‘context requirement’ of Article 15a of the Dutch Copyright Act, 
according to which quotations had to serve the purpose of criticism or review, has been attenuated. 
Instead, the Dutch legislator focused on the fact that Article 5(3)(d) ISD allows quotations for 
purposes such as criticism or review. Use for purposes that are comparable to criticism or review 
have thus been understood to fall within the scope of the EU prototype. 
 
Against this background, Article 15a of the Dutch Copyright Act nowadays is applicable not only to 
quotations in an ‘announcement, criticism or scientific treatise’ but also to quotations in a 
‘publication serving comparable purposes’. Although framed in much more detailed language, the 
quotation right in the Netherlands, similar to the approach taken in the Nordic countries, refers to 
general ethical standards. Article 15a of the Dutch Copyright Act provides: 
 
‘Quotations from a literary, scientific or artistic work in an announcement, criticism or scientific 
treatise or publication for a comparable purpose shall not be regarded as an infringement of 
copyright, provided that:  
1. the work quoted from has been published lawfully; 
2. the quotation is commensurate with what might reasonably be accepted in accordance with social 
custom […];  
3. […]; and 
4. so far as reasonably possible the source, including the author’s name, is clearly indicated.’ 
 
Like the Nordic rule this Dutch implementation leaves ample room for the courts to arrive at fair 
solutions. While the Dutch law is more specific than its Nordic counterpart, by specifying the 
context within quotations are legitimate (‘an announcement, criticism or scientific treatise’), the 
scope of the quotation right is considerable because of the extension to ‘publications serving 
comparable purposes’.62  
                                                 
59
 Intellectual Property Code (France), Article L122-5(3), provides: ‘Once a work has been disclosed, the author may 
not prohibit: […] 3°. on condition that the name of the author and the source are clearly stated: a) analyses and short 
quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or informatory nature of the work in which they are 
incorporated […];’ 
60
 Ole-Andreas Rognstad, Opphavsrett, Universitetsforlaget 2009, p. 241-252. 
61
 Copyright Act of Sweden, Article 22 reads: ‘Anyone may, in accordance with proper usage and to the extent 
necessary for the purpose, quote from works which have been made available to the public.’ Translated text available at 
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/01/51/95/20edd6df.pdf. 
62
 Note however that the interpretation of the term ‘quotation’ in Article 5(3)(d) ISD is central to a preliminary ruling 
currently submitted to the ECJ (Case C145/10). In her Opinion the Advocate General Trstenjak proposes a narrow 
reading: ‘The notion of quotation is not defined in the [Information Society Directive]. In natural language usage, it is 
extremely important for a quotation that third-party intellectual property is reproduced without modification in 
identifiable form. As is made clear by the general examples cited in Article 5(3)(d) of the directive, according to which 
the quotation must be for purposes such as criticism or review, this is not sufficient in itself. There must also be a 
material reference back to the quoted work in the form of a description, commentary or analysis. The quotation must 
therefore be a basis for discussion’. CJEU, case C-145/10, Eva Maria Painer/Axel Springer et al., Opinion AG 
Trstenjak, 12 April 2011, para. 210. 
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Considering this relaxation of the traditional context requirement, the Court of Appeals Arnhem 
concluded, in a case concerning a search engine collecting information from online databases of 
housing agencies, that the broadened quotation right covered information made available by the 
search engine. In the Court’s view, the search results ‘announced’ the contents of underlying source 
databases. With criticism or review no longer being a prerequisite, the Court deemed the taking of 
material by a search engine an expression comparable to traditional forms of quotations.63 In a 
similar case, the Court of Alkmaar clarified that for the quotation right to apply, the reproduction 
and communication of collected data to the public had to keep within the limits of what was 
necessary to give a good impression of the housing offer concerned.64 The Court specified that, 
under this standard, it was permissible to provide search engine users with a description of up to 
155 characters, address and rent details, and one single picture thumbnail not exceeding the format 
of 194x145 pixels.65  
 
In Germany, by contrast, the traditional confinement of the quotation right to criticism or review 
was upheld when implementing the Information Society Directive. This more restrictive approach 
limits the room to manoeuvre for the courts. In the aforementioned decision dealing with Google’s 
image search service (‘Bildersuche’), the German Federal Court of Justice concluded that the 
unauthorized use of picture thumbnails for search engine purposes did not fall under the right of 
quotation in § 51 of the German Copyright Act. To fulfil the traditional context requirement that had 
not been abandoned, the user making the quotation had to establish an inner connection between the 
quoted material and her own thoughts. This requirement was not satisfied in the case of picture 
thumbnails that were merely used to inform the public about contents available on the Internet.66 In 
this context, the Court stated that 
 
‘neither the technical developments concerning the dissemination of information on the Internet nor 
the interests of the parties which the exception seeks to protect justify an extensive interpretation of § 
51 of the German Copyright Act that goes beyond the purpose of making quotations. Neither the 
freedom of information of other Internet users, nor the freedom of communication or the freedom of 
trade of search engine providers, require such an extensive interpretation.’67 
 
This clarification indicates that the German Federal Court of Justice, because of insufficient 
flexibility in the German system of limitations and exceptions, was rendered incapable of solving 
the case on the basis of the right of quotation. Instead, the Court, as explained above, created 
breathing space for the image search service by assuming that Google’s use of the pictures was not 
unlawful because the copyright owner had consented implicitly to use of her material in the image 
search service by making her works available online without employing technical means to block 
the automatic indexing and displaying of online content by search engines.68 This assumption of 
implicit consent bypasses the problem of insufficient flexibility instead of solving it.69  
                                                 
63
 Gerechtshof Arnhem, July 4, 2006, case no. 06/416, LJN AY0089, para. 4.8, published in Mediaforum 2007, p. 21, 
with case comment by B. Beuving; AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 2007, p. 93, with case 
comment by K.J. Koelman. 
64
 Rechtbank Alkmaar, August 7, 2007, case no. 96206, AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 2007, 
p. 148, with case comment by K.J. Koelman. On procedural grounds, the judgement has been annulled by Gerechtshof 
Amsterdam, December 13, 2007, case no. LJN BC0125, online available at www.iept.nl. 
65
 Rechtbank Alkmaar, ibid., para. 4.14. 
66
 Bundesgerichtshof, April 29, 2010, case I ZR 69/08, p. 11-12, online available in German at 
www.bundesgerichtshof.de. Cf. Th. Dreier, ‘Thumbnails als Zitate? – Zur Reichweite von § 51 UrhG in der 
Informationsgesellschaft’, in: U. Blaurock/J. Bornkamm/C. Kirchberg (eds.), Festschrift für Achim Krämer zum 70. 
Geburtstag, Berlin: De Gruyter 2009, p. 225. 
67
 Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., 12-13. 
68
 Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., 14-19. 
69
 See the critical comments by M. Leistner, ‘The German Federal Supreme Court’s Judgment on Google’s Image 
Search – A Topical Example of the “Limitations” of the European Approach to Exceptions and Limitations’, 
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A more flexible implementation of the quotation prototype of Article 5(3)(d) ISD would have 
allowed the German Federal Court of Justice to solve the case more consistently on the basis of the 
right of quotation. In this way, a questionable expansion of the rules governing implicit consent in 
German private law could have been avoided. It is thus important to note in the present context that 
the wording of Article 5(3)(d) ISD has inspired an implementation strategy in the Netherlands 
which seems to bring picture thumbnails under the umbrella of the right of quotation. In Germany, 
by contrast, the maintenance of the traditional context requirement prevents the courts from this 
more extensive reading of the quotation right. 
 
The comparison of different implementation strategies elicits an important point that must not be 
overlooked when assessing the limitations included in the Information Society Directive. 
Implementing the Directive, national law makers often sought to safeguard their individual national 
traditions in the field of exceptions and limitations. They did not necessarily intend to exhaust the 
flexibility inherent in exception prototypes set forth in the Directive. The scope of national 
derivatives of a permissible EU exception, therefore, must not be equated with the breathing space 
offered by the underlying prototype at the European level. These national derivatives may be much 
more restrictive. The EU acquis, in other words, contains flexibilities that may be invisible at the 
national level because of an overly cautious and restrictive implementation. 
 
To identify hidden flexibilities, the wording of a prototype in the Information Society Directive 
must be compared with national derivatives. In all respects where the prototype offers more room 
than a given national implementation, the domestic law maker is free to enhance the scope of the 
use privilege currently offered under national law without trespassing the boundaries of the acquis 
communautaire. The German legislator, for instance, would be free to adhere to the more flexible 
Dutch approach to the quotation right and abandon the traditional context requirement.70 
 
The most flexible implementation of permissible EU exceptions, however, can be achieved by 
including literal copies of the prototypes in the Information Society Directive in national law.71 In 
combination with the open criteria of the three-step test, this implementation strategy leads to a 
semi-open norm that comes close to open-ended defences, such as the US fair use doctrine. The 
norm inevitably remains semi-open because it can hardly empower judges to identify new use 
privileges on the mere basis of abstract criteria, such as those constituting the three-step test. Article 
5 ISD contains an exhaustive enumeration of permissible exceptions. Without changes to the EU 
acquis, this closed catalogue cannot be reopened at the national level. Recalling several EU 
exception prototypes with flexible features that have been highlighted above, the envisioned semi-
open provision, nonetheless, could take the following shape:    
 
‘It does not constitute an infringement to use a work or other subject-matter for non-commercial 
scientific research or illustrations for teaching, for the reporting of current events, for criticism or review 
of material that has already been lawfully made available to the public, or quotations from such material 
                                                                                                                                                                  
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 42 (2011), p. 417; G. Spindler, 
‘Bildersuchmaschinen, Schranken und konkludente Einwilligung im Urheberrecht – Besprechung der Entscheidung 
“Vorschaubilder”’, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2010, p. 785; L. Guibault, ‘Why Cherry-Picking 
Never Leads to Harmonisation’, Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 1 
(2010), p. 55, available online at http://www.jipitec.eu; M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Bridging the Differences between 
Copyright's Legal Traditions – The Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine’, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 57, 
No. 3 (2010), p. 521, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723902.   
70
 However, see the more restrictive approach proposed in CJEU, case C-145/10, Eva Maria Painer/Axel Springer et al., 
Opinion AG Trstenjak, 12 April 2011, para. 210. The Advocate General proposes to interpret the quotation right more 
narrowly in the sense of requiring a ‘material reference’. This more restrictive approach will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
71
 See M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Beperkingen à la carte: Waarom de Auteursrechtrichtlijn ruimte laat voor fair use’, 
AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 2003, p. 10. 
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serving comparable purposes, for caricature, parody or pastiche, or the incidental inclusion in other 
material, provided that such use does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other 
subject-matter and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.’ 
 
Further requirements to be found in the relevant provisions of Article 5 ISD, such as use ‘in 
accordance with fair practice’,72 use ‘to the extent required by the specific purpose’,73 or use ‘to the 
extent justified by the informatory purpose’,74 can be understood to be covered anyway by the 
elements taken from the three-step test. Otherwise, these additional requirements – being flexible 
themselves – could be added without changing the semi-open nature of the proposed provision. The 
same can be said about the requirement, set forth in several provisions of Article 5 ISD, to indicate 
the author’s name. Use without respect for the author’s right of attribution can be understood to 
cause an unreasonable prejudice in the sense of the three-step test. Otherwise, this further 
requirement could also be added to the provision without compromising its flexibility.  
 
With regard to the three-step test, it seems unnecessary to include the first test criterion – certain 
special cases – in the proposed provision. The cases covered by the provision can be regarded as 
‘certain special cases’ in the sense of the three-step test. Adding the certain special cases criterion 
would give the wrong impression that these forms of use must further be restricted. A more detailed 
discussion of the role of the three-step test in the Information Society Directive elucidates this point. 
 
Impact of the Three-Step Test 
 
In line with Article 5(5) ISD, the exceptions and limitations set out in Article 5(1) to (4) ISD  
 
‘shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightholder.’ 
 
The inclusion of this three-step test – modelled, as indicated above, on corresponding international 
provisions in Article 9(2) BC, Article 13 TRIPS and Article 10 WCT – induced the courts in 
different EU Member States to place additional constraints on national exceptions that were defined 
more precisely than the prototypes in the Information Society Directive anyway. Interestingly, this 
restrictive approach to national exceptions based on the three-step test can be observed not only in 
countries where the three-step test itself has been incorporated into national law, such as in France, 
but also in Member States, such as the Netherlands, where the three-step test has not been 
implemented into national law.75 
 
Dutch courts applied the three-step test already prior to the Information Society Directive.76 On the 
one hand, the adoption and implementation of the Directive led to more frequent references to the 
three-step test that are made to confirm and strengthen findings equally following from domestic 
                                                 
72
 Article 5(3)(d) ISD. 
73
 Article 5(3)(d) ISD. 
74
 Article 5(3)(c) ISD. 
75
 For a discussion of different national approaches to the three-step test, see J. Griffiths, The ‘Three-Step Test’ in 
European Copyright Law – Problems and Solutions, Intellectual Property Quarterly 2009, p. 489 (495), online 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1476968; C. Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?, 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 37 (2006), p. 683; K.J. Koelman, ‘De nationale 
driestappentoets’, AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 2003, p. 6. 
76
 In the case ‘Zienderogen Kunst’, dating back to the year 1990, the Dutch Supreme Court invoked the three-step test 
of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention to support its holding that the quotation of a work may not substantially 
prejudice the right holder’s interest in the exploitation of the work concerned. See Hoge Raad, June 22, 1990, no. 
13933, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991, p. 268 with case comment by J.H. Spoor; Informatierecht/AMI 1990, p. 202 
with case comment by E.J. Dommering; Ars Aequi 40 (1991), p. 672 with case comment by H. Cohen Jehoram.  
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rules.77 This way of applying the three-step test has little impact on the Dutch catalogue of statutory 
exceptions. On the other hand, however, the Directive inspired decisions that use the three-step test 
to override precisely-defined exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act. 
 
In a ruling of March 2, 2005, for instance, the District Court of The Hague forced the long-standing 
exception for press reviews onto the sidelines, and invoked the three-step test of the Information 
Society Directive instead.78 The case concerned the unauthorised scanning and reproduction of 
press articles for internal electronic communication (via e-mail, intranet etc.) in ministries – a 
practice that also offered certain search and archive functions. Seeking to determine whether this 
practice was permissible, the Court refused to consider several questions raised by the parties with 
regard to the specific rules laid down in Article 15 of the Dutch Copyright Act and Article 5(3)(c) of 
the Information Society Directive. In the Court’s view, consideration of these specific rules was 
unnecessary because the contested use did not meet the requirements of the EU three-step test 
anyway: 
 
‘The reason for leaving these three questions unanswered is that the digital press review practice of 
the State, in the opinion of the court, does not comply with the so-called three-step test of Article 5(5) 
of the Copyright Directive.’79  
 
In the subsequent discussion of non-compliance with the three-step test, the Court stresses the 
growing importance of digital newspaper exploitation and the impact of digital press reviews on this 
promising market. The ministry press reviews are held to ‘endanger’ a normal exploitation of press 
articles and unreasonably prejudice the publisher’s legitimate interest in digital commercialisation.80 
Hence, they are deemed impermissible. 
 
The French case ‘Mulholland Drive’ also gives evidence of the freezing effect that the restrictive 
application of the three-step test can have. The case was brought by a purchaser of a DVD of David 
Lynch’s film Mulholland Drive who sought to transfer the film into VHS format in order to watch it 
at his mother’s house. Technical protection measures applied by the film producers prevented the 
making of the VHS copy.81 In this regard, the French Supreme Court held that the relevant Articles 
L. 122-5 and L. 211-3 of the French Intellectual Property Code had to be interpreted in the light of 
the three-step test. The exception for private copying could not be invoked against the application of 
technical protection measures when the intended act of copying would conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work concerned.82  
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Examining the private copying exception in the light of this criterion of the three-step test, the 
French Supreme Court rejected the previous decision taken by the Paris Court of Appeals. The latter 
Court had ruled that the intended private copy did not encroach upon the film’s normal DVD 
exploitation.83 The French Supreme Court reversed this holding for two reasons. On the one hand, it 
asserted that a conflict with a normal exploitation had to be determined against the background of 
the enhanced risk of piracy inherent in the digital environment. On the other hand, the Court 
underlined that the exploitation of cinematographic works on DVD was important for recouping the 
investment in film productions.84 The result of this way of applying the test is the erosion of the 
French private copying exception in the digital environment.85 
 
This restrictive application of the three-step test as a means of placing additional constraints on 
national exceptions is due to the structure of Article 5 ISD. The three-step test in the last paragraph 
of the provision can be understood to require an additional scrutiny of exceptions and limitations 
that are narrowly defined at the national level anyway. The inclusion of the criterion of ‘certain 
special cases’ may even be understood to impose an obligation on national legislators to further 
specify the exception prototypes in Article 5(2) and (3) ISD in the sense of an obligation to only 
implement certain special cases of the EU prototypes at the national level.  
 
This restrictive approach based on the three-step test was advocated, in particular, in several 
comments on the Information Society Directive made at the time of its adoption. They may have 
been inspired by the fact that, during the negotiations on the later Directive in the Council Working 
Group, EU Member States had insisted on the maintenance of the majority of limitations existing in 
their national laws. Instead of the initially proposed list of only a few exceptions, the negotiations 
finally led to the current list of 21 permissible exceptions, 20 of which are optional.86 Given this 
gradual expansion of the enumeration of permissible exceptions and limitations, it was felt by 
several commentators that the three-step test should serve as a counterbalance placing additional 
constraints on the catalogue of exceptions and limitations.87 In a follow-up document to the Green 
Paper underlying the Information Society Directive, the European Commission had moreover 
referred to the three-step test as a guiding principle by emphasizing that ‘a number of parties 
suggest the general “economic prejudice” clause in Article 9(2) BC as a point of reference’.88 In the 
light of statements of this nature, it is not surprising that the three-step test was perceived as an 
‘economic prejudice’ test, rather than a balancing tool that seeks to offer flexibility with open-ended 
criteria.89 
 
The clear reference to the international three-step test in the Information Society Directive itself, 
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however, leaves room for an alternative approach. The restrictive understanding of the open test 
criteria is not the only valid interpretation. Recital 44 explicitly recalls that 
 
‘[w]hen applying exceptions and limitations provided for in this Directive, they should be exercised 
in accordance with international obligations. Such exceptions and limitations may not be applied in 
a way which prejudices the legitimate interests of the rightholder or which conflicts with the normal 
exploitation of his work or other subject-matter.’  
 
Hence, the three-step test in Article 5(5) ISD is primarily intended to ensure compliance with 
relevant international obligations, namely the international three-step tests. Considering this close 
link with its international counterparts, however, Article 5(5) ISD can hardly be understood as a 
restrictive control mechanism or even a straitjacket of precisely defined exceptions.  
 
The first three-step test in international copyright law – Article 9(2) BC – was based on a drafting 
proposal tabled by the UK delegation at the 1967 Stockholm Conference for the Revision of the 
Berne Convention.90 Having its roots in the Anglo-American copyright tradition, it is not surprising 
that the three-step test consists of open-ended factors comparable to traditional fair use legislation in 
common law countries. A line between the criteria of the three-step test and the factors to be found 
in fair use provisions, such as the US fair use doctrine, can easily be drawn. The prohibition of a 
conflict with a normal exploitation, for instance, recalls the fourth factor of the US fair use doctrine 
‘effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’91  
 
Not surprisingly, the three-step test was perceived as a flexible framework at the Stockholm 
Conference, within which national legislators would enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national 
limitations and satisfying domestic social, cultural and economic needs.92 This international acquis 
of the provision already indicates that the three-step test must not be misunderstood as a straitjacket 
of national exceptions. On its merits, the flexible formula is a compromise solution allowing Berne 
Union Members to tailor national exceptions and limitations to their specific domestic needs. 
 
In the context of the Information Society Directive, the reappearance of the three-step test in Article 
10 WCT is even more important than the outlined initial understanding of the provision. As pointed 
out in Recital 15, the Information Society Directive particularly aims to implement the new 
international obligations resulting from the aforementioned WIPO Internet Treaties. The reference 
to international obligations in Recital 44, therefore, particularly addresses the three-step test in 
Article 10 WCT. The Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 WCT, however, could hardly be 
more explicit with regard to the flexibility inherent in the international three-step test: 
 
‘It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting Parties to carry forward and 
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appropriately extent into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws 
which have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these provisions 
should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are 
appropriate in the digital network environment. It is also understood that Article 10(2) neither 
reduces nor extends the scope of applicability of the limitations and exceptions permitted by the 
Berne Convention.’ 
 
This balanced Agreed Statement, allowing the extension of traditional and the development of new 
exceptions and limitations with regard to the digital environment, is the result of the deliberations at 
the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference that led to the adoption of the WIPO Internet Treaties. At 
the Conference, the intention to ensure limitations a proper ambit of operation occupied centre 
stage. The basic proposal for the later WIPO Copyright Treaty already noted with regard to 
limitations that,  
 
‘when a high level of protection is proposed, there is reason to balance such protection against other 
important values in society. Among these values are the interests of education, scientific research, the 
need of the general public for information to be available in libraries and the interests of persons 
with a handicap that prevents them from using ordinary sources of information.’93  
 
In this vein, the concern about sufficient breathing space for socially valuable ends played a 
decisive role in the deliberations concerning exceptions and limitations. The Minutes of Main 
Committee I mirror the determination to shelter use privileges. The US sought to safeguard the fair 
use doctrine.94 Denmark feared that the new rules under discussion could become ‘a “straight 
jacket” for existing exceptions in areas that were essential for society’.95 Many delegations opposed 
the later Article 10(2) WCT which subjects current limitations under the Berne Convention to the 
three-step test.96 Korea unequivocally suggested the deletion of paragraph 297 – a proposal which 
was approved by several other delegations.98 Singapore, for instance, elaborated that the second 
paragraph was  
 
‘inconsistent with the commitment to balance copyright laws, where exceptions and limitations 
adopted by the Conference were narrowed, and protection was made broader’.99 
  
The Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 WCT is thus the outcome of an international debate in 
which the need to maintain an appropriate balance in copyright law has clearly been articulated. The 
three-step test of Article 10 WCT is intended not only as a restrictive control mechanism but also as 
a guideline for the extension of existing limitations and exceptions, and the introduction of new 
exemptions in the digital environment. The preamble of the WCT confirms this analysis. It stresses 
the necessity  
 
‘to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly 
education, research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention’.100 
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The international obligations to which Recital 44 of the Information Society Directive refers, 
therefore, can hardly be understood as a heavy burden on law makers seeking to enhance the 
flexibility of limitations and exceptions. The three-step test of Article 5(5) ISD need not necessarily 
be perceived as a restrictive control mechanism. Recital 44 points out that national exceptions and 
limitations 
 
‘should, in particular, duly reflect the increased economic impact that such exceptions or limitations 
may have in the context of the new electronic environment. Therefore, the scope of certain exceptions 
or limitations may have to be even more limited when it comes to certain new uses of copyright 
works and other subject-matter.’ 
 
Recognizing this understandable need to consider an increased economic impact in certain cases, 
however, it must not be forgotten that, in line with the Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 
WCT, it may be indispensable in other cases to carry forward and appropriately extend into the 
digital environment traditional limitations and exceptions, and devise new exceptions and 
limitations that have become necessary. It is not apparent why this breathing space inherent in the 
international acquis should have been eliminated in EU copyright law.101  
 
At the national level, the three-step test has been used in this more flexible sense by the German 
Federal Court of Justice. In a 1999 case concerning the Technical Information Library Hanover, the 
Court underlined the public interest in unhindered access to information. Accordingly, it offered 
support for the Library’s practice of copying and dispatching scientific articles on request by single 
persons and industrial undertakings.102 The legal basis of this practice was the statutory limitation 
for personal use in § 53 of the German Copyright Act. Under this provision, the authorized user 
need not necessarily produce the copy herself but is free to ask a third party to make the 
reproduction on her behalf. The Court admitted that the dispatch of copies came close to a 
publisher’s activity.103 Nonetheless, it refrained from putting an end to the library practice by 
assuming a conflict with a work’s normal exploitation. Instead, the Court deduced an obligation to 
pay equitable remuneration from the three-step test, and enabled the continuation of the information 
service in this way.104  
 
In a 2002 decision concerning the scanning and storing of press articles for internal e-mail 
communication in a private company, the Court gave a further example of its flexible approach to 
the three-step test. It held that digital press reviews had to be deemed permissible under § 49(1) of 
the German Copyright Act just like their analogue counterparts, if the digital version – in terms of 
its functioning and potential for use – essentially corresponded to traditional analogue products.105 
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To overcome the problem of an outdated wording of § 49(1) that seemed to indicate the limitation’s 
confinement to press reviews on paper,106 the Court stated that, in view of new technical 
developments, a copyright limitation may be interpreted extensively.107 Taking these considerations 
as a starting point, the Court arrived at the conclusion that digital press reviews were permissible if 
articles were included in graphical format without offering additional functions, such as a text 
collection and an index. This extension of the analogue press review exception to the digital 
environment, the Court maintained, was in line with the three-step test.108 
  
Hence, the three-step test can be used to enable limitations and enhance flexibility in EU copyright 
law.109 The provision proposed above – consisting of literal copies of EU exception prototypes and 
elements of the three-step test – would make this breathing space visible at the national level. For 
this purpose, however, the three-step test in Article 5(5) ISD must be interpreted in the light of the 
described international, flexible acquis. The Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the ‘Three-
Step Test’ can serve as a guideline in this regard.110  
 
CJEU Jurisprudence 
 
So far, the CJEU has not taken a clear position on the interpretation of the three-step test. The 
indications given in Infopaq, on the one hand, point towards the adoption of the questionable 
general principle that limitations and exceptions must be interpreted restrictively. On the other hand, 
the Court has underlined in Football Association Premier League the importance of lending weight 
to the objective and purpose underlying limitations and exceptions.  
 
Scrutinizing the precisely defined mandatory exemption of transient copies in Article 5(1) ISD in 
Infopaq, the Court recalled that for the interpretation of each of the cumulative conditions of the 
exception, it should be borne in mind  
 
‘that, according to settled case-law, the provisions of a directive which derogate from a general 
principle established by that directive must be interpreted strictly […]. This holds true for the 
exemption provided for in Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29, which is a derogation from the general 
principle established by that directive, namely the requirement of authorisation from the rightholder 
for any reproduction of a protected work.’111 
 
The Court, in other words, took as a starting point the traditional dogma that exceptions and 
limitations, in principle, have to be interpreted restrictively. According to the Court,  
 
‘[t]his is all the more so given that the exemption must be interpreted in the light of Article 5(5) of 
Directive 2001/29, under which that exemption is to be applied only in certain special cases which 
do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.’112 
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This further consideration seems to indicate that the Court infers, from the three-step test, the 
necessity of a strict interpretation of exceptions and limitations. In Football Association Premier 
League, however, this earlier decision did not hinder the Court from emphasizing with regard to the 
same exemption – transient copying in the sense of Article 5(1) ISD – the need to guarantee the 
proper functioning of the exception and ensure an interpretation that takes due account of the 
exception’s objective and purpose. The Court explained that – in spite of the required strict 
interpretation of the conditions laid down in Article 5(1) ISD –  
 
‘the interpretation of those conditions must enable the effectiveness of the exception thereby 
established to be safeguarded and permit observance of the exception’s purpose as resulting in 
particular from recital 31 in the preamble to the Copyright Directive and from Common Position 
(EC) No 48/2000 adopted by the Council on 28 September 2000 with a view to adopting that 
directive (OJ 2000 C 344, p. 1).’113 
 
The Court went on to explain more generally that 
 
‘In accordance with its objective, that exception must allow and ensure the development and 
operation of new technologies and safeguard a fair balance between the rights and interests of right 
holders, on the one hand, and of users of protected works who wish to avail themselves of those new 
technologies, on the other.’114 
 
In the light of these considerations, the Court concluded that the transient copying at issue in 
Football Association Premier League, performed within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a 
television screen, was compatible with the three-step test of Article 5(5) ISD.115 
  
On balance, these first cases seem to indicate that the Court of Justice EU, as many national courts 
in EU Member States, formally adheres to the dogma of a strict interpretation of limitations and 
exceptions. The adoption of this general principle, however, need not necessarily prevent the Court 
from arriving at a balanced solution in an individual case. Hence, the dogma of strict interpretation 
itself may be applied rather flexibly by the Court. A similar approach can be found, for instance, in 
Germany where the Federal Court of Justice keeps referring to the principle of strict interpretation. 
In spite of this constant reference, however, the Court rendered the aforementioned judgments in the 
Technical Information Library Hannover case and the Digital Press Review case, which both testify 
to a flexible application of the three-step test.  
 
At the European level, further cases may follow in which the Court of Justice EU develops a more 
nuanced approach in line with Football Association Premier League. In particular, this may occur in 
respect of limitations and exceptions in the Information Society Directive that are supported by the 
fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression and information in Article 11 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.116 As the Charter 
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of Fundamental Rights has been reinforced in the context of the Lisbon Treaty, it may be invoked 
by the Court to interpret limitations and exceptions less strictly in cases involving the fundamental 
guarantee of freedom of speech. With regard to compliance with the three-step test, the above 
considerations concerning the flexible international acquis may become relevant in this context. 
 
 
4.2 Flexibilities Outside the EU Acquis 
 
The Information Society Directive only harmonizes the right of reproduction, the right of 
communication to the public, the right of making available to the public and the right of 
distribution.117 Other exclusive rights fall outside the scope of the Directive and, thus, outside the 
EU acquis insofar as they are not covered by one of the more specific Directives in the field of 
copyright. 
 
Right of adaptation 
 
Against this background, considerable flexibility outside the EU acquis can be identified in the field 
of the right of adaptation. As Prof. Spoor has shown, a distinction between the right of reproduction 
and the right of adaptation can be drawn by assuming that, while reproduction concerns the copying 
of the particular shape of a work determined by the author, the adaptation right covers changes to 
the underlying corpus mysticum.118 A distinction between the right of reproduction and the right of 
adaptation is also drawn in international copyright law. While Article 9(1) BC establishes a far-
reaching general right of reproduction covering reproduction ‘in any manner or form’, a separate 
right of adaptation is granted in Article 12 BC.119 A distinct right of translation is moreover 
recognized in Article 8 BC. In line with this international framework and the theoretical distinction 
between mere copying and changes to the intellectual substance of a work, the Information Society 
Directive can be understood to cover only literal reproduction. The regulation of transformations – 
changes to the corpus mysticum of a copyright protected work – is left to national lawmaking.120 
 
Examples of national implementation practices confirm this approach. German copyright law, for 
instance, traditionally recognizes that adaptations may be free under certain circumstances.121 This 
‘free use’ privilege requires the transformed material to have new features of its own that make the 
individual features of the original work fade away.122 These requirements may particularly be 
fulfilled in the case of parodies. German courts traditionally exempt parodies from the control of the 
copyright owner on this basis.123 In the ‘Perlentaucher’ case, the German Federal Court of Justice 
confirmed that the general principles governing the determination of free adaptations could also be 
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applied to other transformations.124 The case concerned abstracts derived from book reviews 
published in the German newspaper ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’. 
 
Implementing the Information Society Directive, the free adaptation privilege has been retained in 
Germany. Law makers in Germany, thus, availed themselves of the freedom left under the 
Information Society Directive to regulate the right of adaptation.125 
 
The breathing space that can be created in this way must not be underestimated. In Germany, for 
instance, the Federal Court of Justice recognized in parody cases that the required distance from the 
original work, making its individual features fade away, could not only be achieved through 
substantial alterations of the original work. By contrast, an inner distance, such as the distance 
created by a parodist’s mockery, could also be sufficient.126 An adaptation, therefore, may be free 
even though the original has not been changed substantially. When applied broadly, this 
consideration may become relevant in cases of user-generated content. Arguably, the individual, 
non-commercial nature of certain amateur performances of protected material posted on the Internet 
also justify to assume a sufficient inner distance from the underlying original work. 
 
In the Netherlands, breathing space for parody has traditionally been provided on the basis of the 
rule that adaptations constituting a new, original work fall outside the scope of the right of 
adaptation.127 The requirement of a new, original work has been concretized by the Dutch Supreme 
Court in the sense that the parodist may not take more from the original work than necessary for the 
intended critical statement in the guise of parody.128 While this standard may be considered more 
restrictive than the approach taken in Germany, the existing tradition of creating breathing space for 
parody in this way may serve as a basis for the development of a broader free adaptation rule that 
includes other forms of transformations, such as adaptations made by amateur performers that are 
offered as user-generated content on the Internet. 
 
Parody exception in the Information Society Directive 
 
Besides the outlined national flexibilities that remained untouched by the Information Society 
Directive, such as the free adaptation rule in Germany and the new work exemption in the 
Netherlands, it is to be recalled that in addition, there is a parody exception in Article 5(3)(k) ISD 
that can be understood to offer extra breathing space with regard to cases where a parody, caricature 
or pastiche does not meet the national requirements for a ‘free’ adaptation or a ‘new work’ and, 
instead, is deemed to involve a relevant act of reproduction of protected features of the original. In 
this context, Article 5(3)(k) ISD can be understood to make it clear that, besides those parodies that 
are exempted on the basis of national free adaptation and similar principles, national legislators are 
free to also exempt parodies amounting to relevant reproduction.129 The implementation of the 
Information Society Directive in the Netherlands can serve as an example in this context. Seeking to 
enhance the room for parodies, the Dutch legislator complemented the traditional exemption of new 
works with an explicit parody exception modeled on Article 5(3)(k) ISD.130 
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Impact of the three-step test 
 
When considering the implementation of a national free adaptation rule, the EU three-step test in 
Article 5(5) ISD does not apply. As the right of adaptation falls outside the scope of the Information 
Society Directive, national legislators are not bound by the EU three-step test that regulates 
limitations and exceptions to the rights harmonized under the Directive. 
 
It is to be considered, however, that the international three-step tests of Article 13 TRIPS and Article 
10(2) WCT may become relevant in this context.131 On the one hand, it can be argued that the 
aforementioned national principles – the free adaptation rule in Germany and the new work 
exemption in the Netherlands – define the scope and reach of the right of adaptation rather than 
limiting the exclusive right. In other words, these principles may be seen as part of the definition of 
the right of adaptation – a ‘carve-out’ of certain uses from the scope of the right. In this line of 
reasoning, it is plausible to conclude that the exemption of free adaptations or new works does not 
constitute a limitation or exception in the sense of the international three-step tests of Article 13 
TRIPS and Article 10(2) WCT. 
 
If, on the other hand, these international three-step tests are deemed applicable to national rules, 
such as the free adaptation principle in Germany, it is to be considered that the international three-
step tests are flexible balancing tools that, as elaborated above, seek to offer sufficient breathing 
space for national lawmakers to satisfy domestic social, cultural and economic needs.132 Hence, the 
international three-step tests are unlikely to impose substantial constraints on national lawmakers 
seeking to offer breathing space for parody or user-generated content. Use of this type fulfils 
important social and cultural functions and is supported, as pointed out above, by the fundamental 
guarantee of freedom of expression and information.133 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
There appear to be good reasons and ample opportunity to (re)introduce a measure of flexibility in 
the national copyright systems of Europe. The need for having more openness in copyright law is 
almost self-evident in this ‘information society’ of highly dynamic and unpredictable change. A 
historic perspective also suggests that, due to a variety of circumstances, copyright law, particularly 
in the civil law jurisdictions of Europe, has lost much of its flexibility in the course of the past 
century. In other words, making copyright law in author’s rights regimes more flexible would not go 
against the grain of legal tradition. 
 
Ironically, as copyright law has gradually lost its openness, with the accelerating pace of 
technological change in the 21st Century the need for flexibility has greatly increased. 
Concomitantly, the process of revising copyright law has become a lot more complex and time-
consuming as national lawmakers in the Member States of the EU are increasingly constricted by 
European harmonization, making the need for flexible copyright norms – both at the EU and the 
national levels – even more urgent. 
 
The lack of flexibility of the present system of limitations and exceptions can be demonstrated by 
the way courts in several Member States have struggled to, nevertheless, protect the general social, 
cultural and economic interest by allowing certain ‘free uses’ not expressly recognized in the law, 
by applying a variety of – sometimes implausible – doctrines external to copyright law.  
 
The authors of this study however believe that a measure of flexibility should be available inside the 
system of copyright proper. This need not necessarily imply the introduction into European 
copyright law of an American-style general fair use provision. There are drawbacks and risks 
associated with establishing a completely open norm into copyright systems that, like those of the 
author’s rights tradition in most Member States of the EU, traditionally provide for circumscribed 
limitations and exceptions that offer a good deal of predictability and legal security. We would 
therefore recommend to introduce a measure of flexibility alongside the existing structure of well-
defined limitations and exceptions, and thus combine the advantages of legal security and 
technological neutrality. 
 
As our analysis has demonstrated, the EU copyright acquis leaves considerably more room for 
flexibilities than its closed list of permitted limitations and exceptions prima facie suggests. In the 
first place, the enumerated provisions are in many cases categorically worded prototypes rather than 
precisely circumscribed exceptions, thus leaving the Member States broad margins of 
implementation, as is confirmed by actual legislative practice in various Member States. In the 
second place, the EU acquis leaves ample unregulated space with regard to the right of adaptation 
that has so far remained largely unharmonized.  
 
A Member State desiring to take full advantage of all policy space available under the Information 
Society Directive, and thus maximize flexibilities available at the EU level, might achieve this by 
literal transposition of the Directive’s entire catalogue of exception prototypes into national law. In 
combination with the three-step test, this would effectively lead to a semi-open norm almost as 
flexible as the fair use rule of the United States. For less ambitious Member States seeking to 
enhance flexibility while keeping its existing structure of limitations and exceptions largely intact, 
we recommend exploring the policy space left by distinct exception prototypes. For example, 
Article 5(3) of the Directive apparently would allow Member States to exempt a much wider range 
of ‘fair’ educational and scientific uses than many national laws presently provide. And the 
quotation right set forth in Article 5(3)(d), arguably, leaves room for an exception permitting the fair 
use of copyright protected material for the purposes of search engines and other reference tools. In 
addition, the unharmonized status of the adaptation right would leave Member States free to provide 
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for limitations and exceptions permitting, for instance, fair (i.e. non-commercial) transformative 
uses in the context of user-generated content. 
 
Flexible limitations that are compliant with EU law might come in different forms, either as outright 
exceptions allowing free uses, or as compensated limitations. An exception that would permit fair 
transformative uses could be modeled, for example, on the proposal that is currently before the 
Canadian parliament.134 While the Canadian proposal allows the creation and subsequent posting on 
a platform of user-generated content that builds upon pre-existing works without compensation, one 
could also imagine a variant that provides for remuneration to be paid by intermediaries that 
commercially benefit from user-generated content on their platforms. 
 
The three-step test enshrined in the Information Society Directive as such does not in our opinion 
present an insurmountable obstacle to broadly worded limitations and exceptions at the national 
level, insofar as the core of the economic right(s) protected under copyright is left intact. An 
impediment however may arise from the rule of narrow construction of the exceptions enumerated 
in the Directive that the Court of Justice of the EU has articulated in recent cases. On the other 
hand, the Court has also indicated that exceptions are to be interpreted in ways that allow them to 
fulfil their purpose. Moreover, it is to be expected that the EU Charter, which expressly recognizes a 
catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms including freedom of expression and information as a 
primary source of EU law, will in due course lead to more liberal readings of the Directive’s 
catalogue of exceptions.  
 
Whatever trend prevails, Member States aspiring to introduce flexible copyright norms are advised 
to take advantage of the policy space that presently exists in EU law, and not wait until initiatives to 
introduce flexibilities at the EU level materialize – a process that could easily take ten years. In this 
way, national models can be developed and tested in practice that may serve as a basis for more 
flexible future law making at EU level. 
 
 
 
***** 
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